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Abstract
The paper adresses the problem of reasoning with
ambiguities. Semantic representations are presented
that leave scope relations between quantiers and/or
other operators unspecied. Truth conditions are
provided for these representations and dierent con-
sequence relations are judged on the basis of intuitive
correctness. Finally inference patterns are presented
that operate directly on these underspecied struc-
tures, i.e. do not rely on any translation into the set
of their disambiguations.
1 Introduction
Whenever we hear a sentence or read a text we build
up mental representations in which some aspects of
the meaning of the sentence or text are left underspe-
cied. And if we accept what we have heard or read
as true, then we will use these underspecied repre-
sentations as premisses for arguments. The challenge
is, therefore, to equip underspecied semantic repre-
sentations with well-dened truth conditions and to
formulate inference patterns for these representati-
ons that follow the arguments that we judge as in-
tuitively correct. Several proposals exist for the de-
nition of the language, but only very few authors
have addressed the problem of dening a logic of
ambiguous reasoning.
[8] considers lexical ambiguities and investigates
structural properties of a number of consequence re-
lations based on an abstract notion of coherency. It
is not clear, however, how this approach could be
extended to other kinds of ambiguities, especially
quantier scope ambiguities and ambiguities trigge-
red by plural NPs. [1], [7] and [6] deal with ambigui-
ties of the latter kind. They give construction rules
and dene truth conditions according to which an
underspecied representation of an ambiguous sent-
ence is true if one of its disambiguations is. The pro-
blem of reasoning is adressed only in [5] and [7]. [5]'s
inference schemata yield a very weak logic only; and
[7]'s deductive component is too strong. Being weak
and strong depends of course on the underlying con-
sequence relation. Neither [5] nor [7] make any att-
empt to systematically derive the consequence rela-
tion that holds for reasoning with ambiguities on the
basis of an empirical discussion of intuitively valid
arguments.
The present paper starts out with such a discussion
in Section 2. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to
the theory of UDRSs. It gives a sketch of the princip-
les to construct UDRSs and shows how scope ambi-
guities of quantiers and negation are represented in
an underspecied way. As the rules of inference pre-
sented in [7] turn out to be sound also with respect
to the consequence relation dened in Section 2 the-
se rules (for the fragment without disjunction) will
be discussed only briey in Section 4. The change
in the deduction system that is imposed by the new
consequence relation comes with the rules of proof.
Section 5 shows that it is no longer possible to use
rules like Conditionalisation or Reductio ad Absur-
dum when we deal with real ambiguities in the goal.
An alternative set of rules is presented in Section 6.
2 Consequence Relations
In this section we will discuss some sample argu-
ments containing ambiguous expressions in the data
as well as in the goal. We consider three kinds of am-
biguities: lexical ambiguities, quantier scope ambi-
guities, and ambiguities with respect to distributi-
ve/collective readings of plural noun phrases. The
discussion of the arguments will show that the mea-
ning of ambiguous sentences not only depends on
the set of its disambiguations. Their meanings al-
so depend on the context, especially on other oc-
currences of ambiguities. Each disambiguation of an
ambiguous sentence may be correlated to disambi-
guations of other ambiguous sentences such that the
choice of the rst disambiguation also determines the
choice of the latter ones, and vice versa. Thus the re-
presentation of ambiguities requires some means to
implement these correlations.
To see that this is indeed the case let us start discus-
sing some consequence relations that come to mind
when dealing with ambiguous reasoning. The rst
one we will consider is the one that allows to derive
a(n ambiguous) conclusion  from a set of (ambi-
guous) premisses   if some disambiguation of  fol-
lows from all readings of  . Assuming that  and 
0
are operators mapping a set of ambiguous represen-
tations  onto one of its disambiguations 

or 

0
we may represent this by.
89
0
( 

j= 

0
):(1)
Obviously (1) is the relation we get if we interpret
ambiguities as being equivalent to the disjunctions of
their readings. To interpret ambiguities in this way
is, however, not correct. For ambiguities in the goal
this is witnessed by (2).
j= Everybody slept or everybody didn
0
t sleep:(2)
Intuitively (2) is contingent, but would { according
to the relation in (1) { be classied as a tautology.
In this case the consequence relation in (3) gives the
correct result and therefore seems to be preferable.
88
0
( 

j= 

0
)(3)
But there is another problem with (3). It does not
fulll Reexivity, which (1) does.
Reexivity   j=  , if  2  
To do justice to both, the examples in (2) and Ree-
xivity, we would have to interpret ambiguous sent-
ences in the data also as conjunctions of their rea-
dings, i.e. accept (4) as consequence relation.
9
0
9( 

j= 

0
)(4)
But this again contradicts intuitions. (4) would sup-
port the inferences in (5), which are intuitively not
correct.
(5)
a. There is a big plant in front of my house.
j= There is a big building in front of my house.
b. Everybody didn't sleep. j= Everybody was awake.
c. Three boys got $10. j= Three boys got $10 each.
Given the examples in (5) we are back to (1) and may
think that ambiguities in the data are interpreted as
disjunctions of their readings. But irrespective of the
incompatibility with Reexivity this picture cannot
be correct either, because it distroys the intuitively
valid inference in (6).
If the students get $10 then they buy books.
The students get $10. j= They buy books.
(6)
This example shows that disambiguation is not an
operation  that takes (a set of) isolated sentences.
Ambiguous sentences of the same type have to be
disambiguated simultaneously.
1
Thus the meaning of
1
We will not give a classication or denition of am-
biguities of the same type here. Three major classes will
consist of lexical ambiguities, ambiguities with respect
to distributive/collective readings of plural noun phra-
ses, and quantier scope ambiguities. As regards the last
type we assume on the one hand that only sentences
with the same argument structure and the same set of
readings can be of the same type. More precisely, if two
sentences are of the same type with respect to quanti-
er scope ambiguities, then the labels of their UDRS's
the premise of (6) is given by (7b) not by (7a), where
a
1
represents the rst and a
2
the second reading of
the second sentence of (6).
a. ((a
1
! b) _ (a
2
! b)) ^ (a
1
_ a
2
)
b. ((a
1
! b) ^ a
1
) _ ((a
2
! b) ^ a
2
)
(7)
We will call sentence representations that have to
be disambiguated simultaneously correlated ambi-
guities . The correlation may be expressed by coinde-
xing. Any disambiguation  that simultaneously di-
sambiguates a set of representations coindexed with
i is a disambiguation that respects i , in symbols 
i
. A
disambiguation  that respects all indices of a given
set I is said to respect I , written 
I
. Let I be a set
of indices, then the consequence relation we assume
to underly ambiguous reasoning is given in (8)
8
I
( 

I
j= 

I
)(8)
The general picture we will follow in this paper is the
following. We assume that a set of representations  
represents the mental state of a reasoning agent R.
  contains underspecied representations. Correlati-
ons between elements of   indicate that they share
possible ways of disambiguation. Suppose  is only
implicitly contained in  . Then R may infer it from
  and make it explicit by adding it to its mental
state. This process determines the consequence rela-
tion relative to which we develop our inference pat-
terns. That means we do not consider the case where
R is asked some query  by another person B. The
additional problem in this case consists in the array
of possibilities to establish correlations between B's
query and R's data, and must be adressed within a
proper theory of dialogue.
Consider the following examples. The data contains
two clauses. The rst one is ambiguous, but not in
the context of the second.
a. Every pitcher was broken. They had lost.
j= Every pitcher was broken.
b. Everybody didn't sleep. John was awake.
j= Everybody didn't sleep.
c. John and Mary bought a house.
It was completely delapidated.
j= John and Mary bought a house.
(9)
If the inference is now seen as the result of R's task
to make the rst sentence explicit (which of course
is trivial here), then the goal will not be ambiguous,
because it simply is another occurrence of the repre-
sentation in the data, and, therefore, will carry the
same correlation index. In the second case, i.e. the
case where the goal results from R's processing some
external input, there is no guarantee for such a cor-
relation. R might consider the goal as ambiguous,
and hence will not accept it as a consequence. (B
might after all have had in mind just that reading
of the sentence that is not part of R's knowledge.)
must be ordered isomorphically. On the other hand two
sentences may carry an ambiguity of the same type if
one results from the other by applying Detachment to a
universally quantied NP (see Section 4).
We will distinguish between these two situations by
requiring the provability relation to respect indices.
The rule of direct proof will then be an instance of
Reexivity:   ` 
i
if 
i
2  .
3 A short introduction to UDRSs
The base for unscoped representations proposed in
[7] is the separation of information about the struc-
ture of a particular semantic form and of the content
of the information bits the semantic form combines.
In case the semantic form is given by a DRS its struc-
ture is given by the hierarchy of subDRSs, that is de-
termined by ), :, _ and 3. We will represent this
hierarchy explicitly by the subordination relation .
The semantic content of a DRS consists of the set of
its discourse referents and its conditions. To be more
precise, we express the structural information by a
language with one predicate  that relates individu-
al constants l, called labels. The constants are names
for DRS's.  corresponds to the subordination rela-
tion between them, i.e. the set of labels with  is a
upper semilattice with one-element (denoted by l
>
).
Let us consider the DRSs (11) and (12) representing
the two readings of (10).
Everybody didn't pay attention.(10)
x
human(x)
)
:x pay attention
(11)
:
x
human(x)
)
x pay attention
(12)
The following representations make the distinction
between structure and content more explicit. The
subordination relation  is read from bottom to top.
(13)
x
human(x)
)
:
x pay attention
:
x
human(x)
)
x pay attention
Having achieved this separation we are able to re-
present the structure that is common to both, (11)
and (12), by (14).
x
human(x)
) :
x pay att.
(14)
(14) is already the UDRS that represents (10) with
scope relationships left unresolved. We call the no-
des of such graphs UDRS-components . Each UDRS-
component consists of a labelled DRS and two func-
tions scope and res, which map labels of UDRS-
components to the labels of their scope and restric-
tor, respectively. DRS-conditions are of the form
hQ; l
i1
; l
i2
i, with quantierQ , restrictor l
i1
and scope
l
i2
, of the form l
i1
)l
i2
, or of the form l
i
::l
i1
. A
UDRS is a set of UDRS-components together with
a partial order ORD of its labels.
If we make (some) labels explicit we may represent
(14) as in (15).
hl
>
:hl
1
:
x
) ,l
2
:: ,l
3
: x pay att. i,ORDi(15)
If ORD in (15) is given as fl
2
 scope(l
1
); l
3

scope(l
2
)g then (15) is equivalent to (11), and in
case ORD is fl
1
 scope(l
2
); l
3
 scope(l
1
)g we get
a description of (12). If ORD is fl
3
 scope(l
1
); l
3

scope(l
2
)g then (15) represents (14), because it only
contains the information common to both, (11) and
(12).
In any case ORD lists only the subordination re-
lations that are neither implicitly contained in the
partial order nor determined by complex UDRS-
conditions. This means that (15) implicitly contains
the information that, e.g., res(l
2
)  l
>
, and also that
res(l
2
)  l
2
, res(l
1
)  l
>
and scope(l
1
)  l
>
.
In this paper we consider the fragment of UDRSs wi-
thout disjunction. For reason of space we cannot con-
sider problems that arise when indenites occurring
in subordinate clauses are interpreted specically.
2
We will, therefore assume that indenites behave li-
ke generalized quantifers in that their scope is clause
bounded too, i.e. require ll
0
for all i in clause (ii.c)
of the following denition.
Denition 1:
(i) hl:hU
K
; C
0
K
[ C
00
K
i; res(l); scope(l); ORD
l
i is a
UDRS-component , if hU
K
; C
0
K
i is a DRS containing
standard DRS-conditions only, and C
00
K
is one of the
following sets of labelled DRS-conditions, where K
1
andK
2
are standard DRSs, Q
x
is a generalized quan-
tication over x , and l
0
is the upper bound of a (sub-
ordinate) UDRS-clause hl
0
:h
0
; :::; 
n
i;ORD
0
l
i (de-
ned below).
(a) fg, or fsub(l
0
)g
(b) fl
1
) l
2
; l
1
:K
1
; l
2
:K
2
g, or
fl
1
) l
2
; l
1
:K
1
; l
2
:K
2
; l
1
:sub(l
0
)g
(c) fhQ
x
l
1
; l
2
i; l
1
:K
1
; l
2
:K
2
g, or
fhQ
x
l
1
; l
2
i; l
1
:K
1
; l
2
:K
2
; l
1
:sub(l
0
)gg
3
(d) f:l
1
; l
1
:K
1
g
If C
00
K
6= fg then l
1
) l
2
, hQ
x
l
1
; l
2
i, or :l
1
is called
distinguished condition of K , referred to by l:.
res and scope are functions on the set of labels, and
ORD
l
is a partial order of labels. res(l), scope(l),
and ORD
l
are subject to the following restrictions:
2
These problems are discussed extensively in [7] and
the solution given there can be taken over to the rules
presented here.
3
Whenever convenient we will simply use implicative
conditions of the form l
1
) l
2
, to represent universally
quantied NPs (instead of their generalized quantier
representation hevery; l
1
; l
2
i).
(a) () If :l
1
2 C
00
K
, then
res(l) = scope(l) = l
1
and l
1
<l 2 ORD
l
.
4
() If h); l
1
; l
2
i2 C
00
K
, or Q
x
l
1
; l
2
2 C
00
K
, then
res(l) = l
1
, scope(l) = l
2
, and l
1
<l , l
2
<l ,
l
1
6=l
2
2 ORD
l
.
() Otherwise res(l) = scope(l) = l
(b) If k:sub(l
0
)2 C
00
K
, then l
0
<k 2 ORD
l
and
ORD
l
0
ORD
l
.
(ii) A UDRS-clause is a pair hl:h
0
; :::; 
n
i;ORD
l
i,
where 
i
= hl
i
:K
i
; res(l
i
); scope(l
i
); ORD
l
i
i, 0  i
 n, are UDRS components, and ORD
l
contains all
of the conditions in (a) to (c) and an arbitrary subset
oif those in (d) and (e).
(a) ORD
l
i
 ORD
l
, for all i, 0  i  n
(b) l
0
scope(l
i
) 2 ORD
l
for all i, 1  i  n
(c) l
i
l 2 ORD
l
for all i, 1  i  n.
(d) l
i
scope(l
j
) 2 ORD
l
, for some i,j 1  i,j  n
such that ORD is a partial order.
For each i, 1  i  n, l
i
is called a node. l is called
upper bound and l
0
lower bound of the UDRS-clause.
Lower bounds neither have distinguished conditions
nor is there an l
0
such that l
0
<l .
(iii) A UDRS-database is a set of UDRSs
fhl
i
>
: ;ORD
l
i
>
ig
i
. A UDRS-goal is a UDRS.
For the fragment of this paper UDRS-components
that contain distinguished conditions do not contain
anything else, i.e. they consist of labelled DRSs K
for which U
K
= C
0
K
= fg if C
00
K
6= fg. We assume
that semantic values of verbs are associated with
lower bounds of UDRS-clauses and NP-meanings
with their other components. Then the denition of
UDRSs ensures that
5
(i) the verb is in the scope of each of its arguments,
(clause (ii.b)),
(ii) the scope of proper quantiers is clause boun-
ded, (clause (ii.c))
For relative clauses the upper bound label l
0
is sub-
ordinated to the label l of its head noun (i.e. the
restrictor of the NP containing the relative) by l
0
<l
(see (ii)). In the case of conditionals the upper bound
label of subordinate clauses is set equal to the la-
bel of the antecedent/consequent of the implicati-
ve condition. The ordering of the set of labels of a
UDRS builds an upper-semilattice with one-element
l
>
. We assume that databases are constructed out of
sequences S
1
, ..., S
n
of sentences. Having a unique
one-element l
i
>
associated with each UDRS repre-
senting a sentence S
i
is to prevent any quantier of
S
i
to have scope over (parts of) any other sentence.
4
We dene l < l
0
:= l  l
0
^ l 6= l
0
.
5
For the construction of underspecied representati-
ons see [2], this volume.
4 Rules of Inference
The four inference rules needed for the fragment wi-
thout generalized quantiers
6
and disjunction are
non-empty universe (NeU), detachment (DET), am-
biguity introduction (AI), and ambiguity eliminati-
on (DIFF). NeU allows to add any nite collection
of discourse referents to a DRS universe. It reects
the assumption that there is of necessity one thing,
i.e. that we consider only models with non-empty
universes. DET is a generalization of modus ponens.
It allows to add (a variant of) the consequent of an
implication (or the scope of a universally quantied
condition) to the DRS in which the condition occurs
if the antecedent (restrictor) can be mapped to this
DRS. AI allows one to add an ambiguous represen-
tation to the data, if the data already contains all
of its disambiguations. And an application of DIFF
reduces the set of readings of an underspecied re-
presentation in the presence of negations of some
of its readings. The formulations of NeU, DET and
DIFF needed for the consequence relation (8) de-
ned in Section 2 of this paper are just renements of
the formulations needed for the consequence relation
(1). As the latter case is extensively discussed in [7]
and a precise and complete formulation of the rules
is also given there we will restrict ourselves to the
renements needed to adapt these rules to the new
consequence relation.
As there is nothing more to mention about NeU we
start with DET. We rst present a formulation of
DET for DRSs. It is an extended formulation of stan-
dard DET as it allows for applications not only at
the top level of a DRS but at levels of any depth.
Correctness of this extension is shown in [4].
DET Suppose a DRS K contains a condition of the
form K
1
) K
2
such that K
1
may be embedded
into K by a function f, where K is the merge of
all the DRSs to which K is subordinate. Then
we may add K
0
2
to K, where K
0
2
results from
K
2
by replacing all occurrences of discourse re-
ferents of U
K
2
by new ones and the discourse
referents x declared in U
K
1
by f(x).
We will generalize DET to UDRSs such that the
structure that results from an application of DET
to a UDRS is again a UDRS, i.e. directly represents
some natural language sentence. We, therefore, in-
corporate the task of what is usually done by a rule
of thinning into the formulation of DET itself and
also into the following denition of embedding. We
dene an embedding f of a UDRS into a UDRS to be
a function that maps labels to labels and discourse
referents to discourse referents while preserving all
conditions in which they occur. We assume that f is
one-to-one when f is restricted to the set of discour-
6
We will use implicative conditions of the form
h); l
1
; l
2
i, to represent universally quantied NPs (in-
stead of their generalized quantier representation
hevery; l
1
; l
2
i).
se referents occurring in proper sub-universes. Only
discourse referents occurring in the universe associa-
ted with l
>
may be identied by f. We do not assume
that the restriction of f to the set of labels is one-
to-one also. But f must preserve :, ) and _, i.e.
respect the following restrictions.
(i) if l:)(l
1
,l
2
) occurs in K
0
, then f(l):)(f(l
1
),f(l
2
)),
(ii) if l::l
1
occurs in K
0
, then f(l)::f(l
1
).
For the formulation of the deduction rules it is con-
venient to introduce the following abbreviation. Let
K be a UDRS and l some of its labels. Then K
l
is
the sub-UDRS of K dominated by l , i.e. K
l
contains
all conditions l
0
: such that l
0
l and its ordering re-
lation is the restriction of K's ordering relation.
Suppose  = l
0
:l
1
)l
2
is the distinguished conditi-
on of a UDRS component l:K occurring in a UDRS
clause K
l
of a UDRS K. And suppose there is an
embedding f of K
l
1
into a set of conditions l
0
: of K
such that l  l
0
. Then the result of an application
of DET to  is a clause K
0
l
that is obtained from
K
l
by (i) eliminating K
l
1
from K
l
(ii) replacing all
occurrences of discourse referents in the remaining
structure by new ones and the discourse referents x
declared in the universe of l
1
, by f(x); (iii) substitu-
ting l
0
for l, l
1
, and l
2
in ORD
l
; and (iv) replacing
all other labels of K
l
by new ones.
But note that applications of DET are restricted to
NPs that occur 'in the context of' implicative condi-
tions, or monotone increasing quantiers, as shown
in (16). Suppose we know that John is a politician,
then:
Few problems preoccupy every politician.
6` Few problems preoccupy John.
Every politician didn't sleep.
6` John didn't sleep.
At least one problem preoccupies every pol.
` At least one problem preoccupies John.
(16)
(16) shows that DET may only be applied to a con-
dition  occurring in l:K , if there is no component
l
0
:K
0
such that the distinguished condition l
0
:
0
of
K
0
is either a monotone decreasing quantier or a
negation, and such that for some disambiguation of
the clause in which  occurs we get l  scope(l
0
).
As the negation of a monotone decreasing quantier
is monotone increasing and two negations neutralize
each other the easiest way to implement the restric-
tion is to assign polarities to UDRS components and
restrict applications of DET to components with po-
sitive polarity as follows.
Suppose l:K occurs in a UDRS clause
hl
0
:h
0
; :::; 
n
i;ORD
l
0
i, where l
0
has positive pola-
rity, written l
+
0
. Then l has positive (negative) pola-
rity if for each disambiguation the cardinality of the
set of monotone decreasing components (i.e. mono-
tone decreasing quantiers or negations) that takes
wide scope over l is even (odd). Negative polarity
of l
0
is induces the complementary distribution of
polarity marking for l . If l is the label of a com-
plex condition, then the polarity of l determines the
polarity of the arguments of this condition accor-
ding to the following patterns: l
+
:l
 
1
)l
+
2
, l
 
:l
+
1
)l
 
2
,
l
+
::l
 
1
, and l
 
::l
+
1
. l
i
>
has positive polarity for every
i . The polarity of the upper bound label of a UDRS-
clause is inherited from the polarity of the label the
UDRS-clause is attached to. Verbs, i.e. lower bounds
of UDRS-clauses, always have denite polarities if
the upper bound label of the same clause has.
Two remarks are in order before we come to the for-
mulation of DET. First, the polarity distribution can
be done without explicitly calculating all disambi-
guations. The label l of a component l :K is positive
(negative) in the clause in which occurs, if the set
of components on the path to the upper bound la-
bel l
+
0
of this clause contains an even (odd) number
of polarity changing elements, and all other com-
ponents of the clause (i.e. those occurring on other
paths) do not change polarity. Second, the fragment
of UDRSs we are considering in this paper does not
contain a treatment of n-ary quantiers. Especial-
ly we do not deal with resumptive quantiers, like
<no boy; no girl> in No boy likes no girl. If we
do not consider the fact that this sentence may be
read as No boy likes any girl the polarity mar-
king dened above will mark the label of the verb as
positive. But if we take this reading into account, i.e.
allow to construe the two quantied NPs as constitu-
ents of the resumptive quantier, then one negation
is cancelled and the label of the verb cannot get a
denite value.
7
To represent DET schematically we
write hl
>
:(l

:);ORDi to indicate that l

:K is a
component of the UDRS K
l
>
with polarity  and
distinguished condition .
 hl
>
:(l
+
i
:l
 
i1
) l
+
i2
);ORDi f : K
l
i1
7!  exists
f(K
l
i2
)
The scheme for DET allows the arguments of the
implicative condition to which it is applied still to be
ambiguous. The discussion of example (6) in Section
2 focussed on the ambiguity of its antecedent only.
(We ignored the ambiguity of the consequent there.)
To discuss the case of ambiguous consequents we
consider the the following argument.
If the chairman talks, everybody doesn't sleep.
The chairman talks. ` Everybody doesn't sleep.
(17)
There is a crucial dierence between (17) and (6):
The truth of the conclusion in (17) depends on the
fact that it is derived from the conditional. It, the-
refore, must be treated as correlated with the conse-
quent of the conditional under any disambiguation.
No non-correlated disambiguations are allowed. To
ensure this we must have some means to represent
7
A general treatment of n-ary quantication within
the theory of UDRSs has still to be worked out. In [6] it
is shown how cumulative quantication may be treated
using identication of labels.
the 'history' of the clauses that are added to a set of
data. As (8) suggests this could be done by coinde-
xing K
l
i1
and K
f(l
i1
)
in the representation of (17).
In contrast to the obligatory coindexing in the ca-
se of (17) the consequence relation in (8) does allow
for non-correlated interpretations in the case of (2).
Such interpretations naturally occur if, e.g., the con-
ditional and the minor premiss were introduced by
very distinct parts of a text from which the databa-
se had been constructed. In such cases the interpre-
ter may assume that the contexts in which the two
sentences occurred are independent of each other.
He, therefore, leaves leeway for the possibility that
(later on) each context could be provided with more
information in such a way that those interpretations
trigger dierent disambiguations of the two occur-
rences. In such cases "crossed interpretations" must
be allowed, and any application of DET must be
refused by contraindexing { except the crossed in-
terpretations can be shown to be equivalent. For the
sake of readability we present the rule only for the
propositional case.
 
i
) 
j

k
i = k _ (i 6= k ^ ` 
i
, 
k
)

j
But the interpreter could also adopt the strategy to
accept the argument also in case of non-correlated
interpretations without checking the validity of 
i
,

k
. In this case he will conclude that 
j
holds un-
der the proviso that he might revise this inference
if there will be additional information that forces
him to disambiguate in a non-correlated way. If then

i
, 
k
does not hold he must be able to give up
the conclusion 
j
and every other argument that
was based on it. To accomodate this strategy we
need more than just coindexing. We need means to
represent the structure of whole proofs. As we ha-
ve labels available in our language we may do this
by adopting the techniques of labelled deductive sy-
stems ([3]). For reasons of space we will not go into
this in further detail.
The next inference rule, AI, allows one to introduce
ambiguities. It contrasts with the standard rule of
disjunction introduction in that it allows for the in-
troduction of a UDRS  that is underspecied with
respect to the two readings 
1
and 
2
only if both,

1
and 
2
, are contained in the data. This shows
once more that ambiguities are not treated as dis-
junctions.
Ambiguitiy Introduction Let 
1
and 
2
be two
UDRSs of  that dier only w.r.t. their ORDs.
Then we may add a UDRS 
3
to  that is like

1
but has the intersection of ORD and ORD
0
as ordering of its labels. The index of 
3
is new
to .
We give an example to show how AI and DET inter-
act in the case of non-correlated readings: Suppose
the data  consists of 
1
, 
2
and 
3
) . We want
to derive . We apply AI to 
1
and 
2
and add 
3
to
. As the index of 
3
is new we must check whether

1
, 
2
can be derived from . Because  contains
both of them the proof succeeds.
The last rule of inference, DIFF, eliminates ambi-
guities on the basis of structural dierences in the
ordering relations. Suppose 
1
and 
2
are a under-
specied representations with three scope bearing
components l
1
, l
2
, and l
3
. Assume further that 
1
has readings that correspond to the following orders
of these components: hl
3
, l
2
, l
1
i, hl
2
, l
3
, l
1
i, and hl
2
,
l
1
, l
3
i, whereas 
2
is ambiguous between hl
2
, l
3
, l
1
i
and hl
2
, l
1
, l
3
i. Suppose now that the data contains

1
and the negation of 
2
. Then this set of data
is equivalent to the reading given by hl
3
, l
2
, l
1
i. To
see that this holds the structural dierence between
the structures ORD

1
and ORD

2
has to be calcu-
lated. The structural dierence between two struc-
tures ORD

1
and ORD

2
is the partial order that
satises ORD

1
but not ORD

2
, if there is any; and
it is falsity if there is no such order. Thus the noti-
on of structural dierence generalizes the traditional
notion of inconsistency. Again a precise formulation
of DIFF is given in [7].
5 Rules of Proof
Rules of proof are deduction rules that allow us to
reduce the complexity of the goal by accomplishing
a subproof. We will consider COND(itionalization)
and R(eductio)A(d)A(bsurdum) and show that they
may not be applied in the case of ambiguous goals
(i.e. goals in which no operator has widest scope).
Suppose we want to derive everybody didn't sno-
re from everybody didn't sleep and the fact
that snoring implies sleeping. I.e. we want to car-
ry out the proof in (18), where ORD = fl
3

scope(l
1
); l
3
 scope(l
2
); l
5
 scope(l
4
)g and ORD
0
= fl
8
 scope(l
7
); l
8
 scope(l
6
)g.
hl
>
: hl
1
:
x
) ; l
2
: : ; l
3
: x sleep i; ORDi
hl
>
: hl
4
:
x
x snore
) ; l
5
: x sleep i; ORDi
hl
0
>
: hl
6
:
x
) ; l
7
: : ; l
8
:
x snore
i; ORD
0
i
(18)
Let us try to apply rules of proof to reduce the com-
plexity of the goal. We use the extensions of COND
and RAA given in [7]. There use is quite simple.
An application of COND to the goal in (18) results
in adding hl
>
:
a
, f gi to the data and leaves
hl
0
>
:hl
7
::
a
,l
8
: a snore i, ORD" i to be shown, whe-
re ORD
00
results from ORD
0
by replacing l
6
and
scope(l
6
) with l
0
>
. RAA is now applicable to the
new goal in a standard way. It should be clear, ho-
wever, that the order of application we have cho-
sen, i.e. COND before RAA, results in having given
the universal quantier wide scope over the negati-
on. This means that after having applied COND we
are not in the process of proving the original ambi-
guous goal any more. What we are going to prove
instead is that reading of the goal with universal
quantier having wide scope over the negation. Be-
ginning with RAA instead of COND assigns the ne-
gation wide scope over the quantier, as we would
add hl
0
>
:hl
6
:
x
) ; l
8
: x snore i; ORD
00
i to the
data in order to derive a contradiction.
8
Here ORD
00
results fromORD
0
by replacing l
7
and scope(l
7
) with
l
0
>
.
If we tried to keep the reduction-of-the-goal strategy
we would have to perform the disambiguation steps
to formulas in the data that the order of applica-
tion on COND and RAA triggers. And in addition
we would have to check all possible orders, not only
one. Hence we would perform exactly the same set of
proofs that would be needed if we represented ambi-
guous sentences by sets of formulas. Nothing would
have been gained with respect to any traditional ap-
proach.
We thus conclude that applications of COND and
RAA are only possible if either ) or : has wide
scope in the goal. In this case standard formulati-
ons of COND and RAA may be applied even if the
goal is ambiguous at some lower level of structure.
In case the underspecication occurs with respect
to the relative scope of immediate daughters of l
>
,
however, we must nd some other means to rela-
te non-identical UDRSs in goal and data. What we
need are rules for UDRSs that generalize the success
case for atoms within ordinary deduction systems.
6 Deduction rules for top-level
ambiguities
The inference in (18) can be realised very easily if
we allow components of UDRSs that are marked ne-
gative to be replaced by components with a smal-
ler denotation. Likewise components of UDRSs that
are marked positive may be replaced by components
with a larger denotation. If the component to be re-
placed is the restrictor of a generalized quantier,
then in addition to the polarity marking the sound-
ness of such substitutions depends on the persist-
ence property of the quantier. In the framework
of UDRSs persistence of quantiers has to be de-
ned relative to the context in which they occur. Let
NP
i
be a persistent (anti-persistent) NP. Then NP
i
is called persistent (anti-persistent) in clause S, if
8
If we would treat ambiguous clauses as the disjunc-
tions of their meanings, i.e. take the consequence relation
in (1), then this disambiguation could be compensated
for by applying RESTART (see [7] for details). But re-
lative to the consequence relation under (8) RESTART
is not sound!
this property is preserved under each disambiguati-
on of S. So everybody is anti-persistent in (19e),
but not in (19a), because the wide scope reading for
the negation blocks the inference in (19b). It is not
persistent in (19c) nor in (19d).
a. Everybody didn't come.
b. Everybody didn't come.
6j= Every woman didn't come.
c. More than half the problems were solved
by everybody.
d. It is not true that everybody didn't come.
e. Some problem was solved by everybody.
(19)
The main rule of inference for UDRSs is the following
R(eplacement)R(ule).
RR Whenever some UDRS K
i
>
occurs in a UDRS-
database  and  `K
i
>
 K
0i
>
holds, then K
0i
>
may be added to .
RR is based on the following substitution rule. The
-rules are given below.
SUBST Let l :K be a DRS component occurring in
some UDRS K,  a UDRS-database. Let K
0
be
the UDRS that results from K by substituting
K
0
for K.
Then  `K  K
0
, if (i) or (ii) holds.
(i) l has positive polarity and  ` K  K
0
.
(ii) l has negative polarity and  ` K
0
 K.
Schematically we represent the rule (for the case of
positive polarity) as follows.
, K
i
>
 - l
+
:K
, K
i
>
 - l
+
:K
0
if  ` l
+
:K  l
+
:K
0
For UDRS-components we have the following rule.
 DRS:  ` KK
0
if there is a function
f:U
K
!U
K
0
such that for all 
0
2 C
K
0
there is a
 2 C
K
with  ` f()
0
.
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Complex conditions are dealt with by the following
set of rules. Except for persistence properties they
are still independent of the meaning of any particu-
lar generalized quantier. The success of the rules
can be achieved in two ways. Either by recursively
applying the-rules. Or, by proving the implicative
condition which will guarantee soundness of SUBST.
):
 ` h); l
1
; l
2
ih); l
0
1
; l
0
2
i if
1.  ` K
l
1
 K
l
0
1
, or
2.  ` h!;K
l
1
;K
l
0
1
i
 Q:
(i)  ` hQ; l
1
; l
2
ihQ; l
0
1
; l
0
2
i if Q is persistent and
1.  ` K
l
1
 K
l
0
1
, or
2.  ` h!;K
l
1
;K
l
0
1
i
(ii)  ` hQ; l
1
; l
2
ihQ; l
0
1
; l
0
2
i if Q is anti-pers. and
1.  ` K
l
0
1
 K
l
1
, or
9
f() is  with discourse referents x occurring in 
replaced by f(x).
2.  ` h!;K
l
0
1
;K
l
1
i
 ::
 ` h:; l
1
ih:; l
0
1
i if
1.  ` K
l
0
1
 K
l
1
, or
2.  ` h!;K
l
0
1
;K
l
1
i
The following rules involve lexical meaning of words.
We give some examples of determiner rules to indi-
cate how we may deal with the logic of quantiers
in this rule set. Rules for nouns and verbs refer to
a further inference relation, `
L
. This relation takes
the meaning postulates into account that a parti-
cular lexical theory associates with particular word
meanings.
 Lex:
(i) hevery; l
1
; l
2
ihmore than half; l
1
; l
2
i
(ii) hevery; l
1
; l
2
ihfg; fMaryg; l
2
i
(iii) hno; l
1
; l
2
ihevery; l
1
; l
0
2
::l
2
i
(iv) hsome; l
1
; l
0
2
::l
2
ihnot every; l
1
; l
2
i
(v) snoresleep if `
L
snoresleep
The last rule allows relative scopes of quantiers to
be inverted.
 :
(i) Let l
+
1
:
1
and l
2
:
2
be two quantiers of a UDRS
K such that l
1
immediately dominates l
2
(l
2

i
scope(l
1
)). Let  be the relation between quantiers
that allows neigbourhood exchanges, i.e. 
1
 
2
i
K
l
1
` K
0
l
1
, where K
0
l
1
results from K
l
1
by exchanging

1
and 
2
, i.e. by replacing l
2

i
scope(l
1
) in K
l
1
's
ORD by l
1

i
scope(l
2
). Then
 ` K
l
1
 K
0
l
1
if l
1
:
1
 l
2
:
2
and l
1
:
1
 l
0
:
0
for
all l
0
:
0
that may be immediately dominated by l
1
:
1
(in any disambiguation).
(ii) Analoguously for the case of l
 
1
:
1
having nega-
tive polarity.
The formulation of this rule is very general. In the
simplest case it allows one to derive a sentence where
an indenite quantier is interpreted non-specically
from an interpretation where it is assigned a speci-
c meaning. If the specic/non-specic distinction is
due to a universally quantied NP then the rule uses
the fact that ha; l; sihevery; l; si holds. As other
scope bearing elements may end up between the in-
denite and the universal in some disambiguation
the rule may only be applied, if these elements be-
have exactly the same way as the universal does, i.e.
allow the indenite to be read non-specically. In ca-
se such an element is another universally quantied
NP we thus may apply the rule, but we cannot apply
it is a negation.
7 Conclusion and Further
Perspectives
The paper has shown that it is possible to reason
with ambiguities in a natural, direct and intuitively
correct way.
The fact that humans are able to reason with am-
biguities led to a natural distinction between deduc-
tion systems that apply rules of proof to reduce the
complexity of a goal and systems of logic that are
tailored directly for natural language interpretati-
on and reasoning. Human interpreters seem to use
both systems when they perform reasoning tasks.
We know that we cannot surmount undecidability
(in a non-adhoc way) if we take quantiers and/or
connectives as logical devices in the traditional sen-
se. But as the deduction rules for top-level ambi-
guities given here present an extension of Aristoteli-
an syllogism metamathematical results about their
complexity will be of great interest as well as the
proof of a completeness theorem. Apart from this re-
search the use of the rule system within the task of
natural language understanding is under investiga-
tion. It seems that the Replacement Rules are par-
ticularly suited to do special reasoning tasks nec-
cessary to disambiguate lexical ambiguities, because
most of the deductive processes needed there are in-
dependent of any quanticational structure of the
sentences containing the ambiguous item.
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